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Abstract: While private-sector managerial practices are being widely adopted in
the public sector, few studies have investigated how market mechanisms influence
the motivation or behavior of members of public organizations, or whether there
is a systematic difference in employee motivation or behavior between market-
centered settings and traditional civil service environments within the public
sector. Analyzing large-scale survey data, this study investigates the difference
in employee motivation between two compensation systems in the US federal
government: pay-for-performance and general schedule. The empirical findings
show that employees working in pay-for-performance systems tend to place a
higher value on extrinsic values such as pay, performance ratings, and promotion
than those in general-schedule systems. This indicates that market-centered
managerial practices may undermine the public service motivation of public
servants while attracting extrinsically motivated employees to the public sector.
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INTRODUCTION
It is well documented that public organizations are different from their private
counterparts in many respects—the goals of the organization, institutional rules,
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personnel systems, and employee motivations and behaviors (e.g., Buchanan, 1975;
Rainey, 1982). Over the past three decades, much research has revealed differences
between private and public organizations in behaviors and perceptions of individuals—
known as sector difference—in the field of public administration. Since the New
Public Management movement, public-sector organizations have adopted many man-
agerial principles from the private sector. Pay-for-performance (PFP) is one common
managerial practice that has been widely employed in public organizations. At present,
many federal government agencies utilize alternative pay systems based on the PFP
mechanism, replacing the general schedule (GS) system, in which pay increases are
based on seniority. As the PFP system is pervading in the public sector, it has become
a recurrent theme in public administration research; it lies at the heart of disputes in
the literature over the effects of market-based mechanisms on public organizations
(Houston, 2009; Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2009).
Bureaucracy is considered an organizational system in which monopoly causes
resources to be inefficiently allocated (Niskanen, 1971). In order to correct bureaucratic
inefficiency, administrative reforms such as New Public Management have extensively
adopted market-based managerial practices. The market is an efficient institution that
corrects inefficiency that results from bureaucratic monopoly and inflexibility, and
market-based mechanisms are considered efficient and effective.
A large body of public administration research has documented differences in
motivation, values, and attitudes between market- and nonmarket-based organizations
(Baldwin, 1990; Bozeman, Reed, & Scott, 1992; Buchanan, 1975; Pandey & Kingsley,
2000; Rainey, 1982; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000). However, little research has investigat-
ed how market mechanisms influence motivation in members of public organizations,
and whether there is a difference in motivation between employees in market-centered
settings and those in traditional civil service environments. As PFP is increasingly
applied to the public sector, whether it positively or negatively influences motivation
of public employees is a focal research interest to public administration scholars
(Bertelli, 2006; Houston, 2009; Stazyk, 2009). This study addresses the issue by
assuming PFP as a strong market mechanism influencing public employees’ motivation
and behavior.
Given that most of the critical studies about the adoption of private-sector-based
managerial practices are descriptive, this empirical study will make a significant
contribution to the public administration literature by uncovering whether there are
motivational gaps between the two pay systems within the public sector. Additionally,
the findings of this study are important in that revealing the difference in employee
motivation between the two settings within the same sector seems analogous to a
program evaluation of PFP as a market-based system in the public sector, which will
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give insight and suggest implications for both public administration scholars and
practitioners in public organizations.
BACKGROUND
While GS is a system in which pay increases are made solely on a basis of seniority
or longevity of job tenure, PFP allows employees to receive pay increases on the basis
of their job performance. The latter is intended to improve individual performance
(Lawler, 1971, 1981) and organizational performance and productivity (Locke, Feren,
McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny, 1980; Risher, 2002; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005; Schulz
& Tanguay, 2006). Previous studies have shown that employees’ perceptions of PFP
are rather positive. For instance, Lovrich et al. (1981) found that a majority of employees
believed that a good performance reward system could improve individual performance,
motivation, and organizational productivity. Streib and Nigro (1993) found that a
majority of PFP users and non-users viewed PFP as an effective management tool.
Kellough and Selden (1997) revealed that most state government employees viewed
merit pay as a motivator to improve their job performance, clarify their roles and
responsibilities, and establish a link between performance and pay. At the same time,
PFP can increase the job satisfaction of high job performers, reduce employee
turnover, and attract competent job seekers (Kellough & Selden, 1997; Milkovich &
Wigdor, 1991; Risher, 2002). Additionally, PFP improves communication between
supervisors and subordinates (Ingraham, 1993; Streib & Nigro, 1993).
Agency theory is recognized as a powerful perspective justifying PFP in the public
sector. Agency theory typically deals with the relationship between a principal and an
agent; the former hires the latter to “get things done” to achieve organizational goals
(Lane, 2000; Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001; Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996).
One of the most serious problems in principal-agent interaction is the agency problem
(Eisenhardt, 1989), which occurs when the goals of the principal are in conflict with
those of the agent because the agent tends to pursue his or her self-interest (Eisenhardt,
1989; Lynn et al., 2001). The problem stems from the proposition that the principal
has little information about the behaviors of the agent—information asymmetry.
The principal has two primary options for dealing with information asymmetry: (1)
observing the agent’s behaviors by establishing monitoring systems such as additional
layers of supervision, and (2) adopting a contract using performance-contingent
incentives, which enables the agent to be aligned with the preferences of the principal
(Demski & Feltham, 1978; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999; Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989;
Perrow, 1986). Eisenhardt (1989) argued that while monitoring is used in a short-term
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contract, monetary incentives should be used in a long-term contract. Although the
monitoring mechanism can minimize the shirking by agents, it entails high transaction
costs, and some behaviors are difficult to monitor (Denis et al., 1999; Lynn et al.,
2001). Instead, performance-based incentives are recognized as a cost-effective tool for
resolving goal conflicts and challenges between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt,
1988; Lynn et al., 2001).
PFP has been adopted in federal government agencies in the United States since
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which required all federal agencies to adopt a
merit-based compensation system for middle-level employees and Senior Executive
Service members. PFP is operated in two ways in the United States: demonstration
projects and independent systems. Under the Civil Service Reform Act, federal agencies
can, with congressional authorization, implement demonstration projects that flexibly
design personnel system aspects such as compensation, promotion, and recruitment. The
Office of Personnel Management supports the design, implementation, and evaluation of
federal demonstration projects. Since 1980, it has approved 18 demonstration projects,
and the projects of 10 agencies are currently ongoing, including at the National
Nuclear Security Administration, Air Force Research Laboratory, and Naval Research
Laboratory.
Independent systems are permanent alternative performance-based pay programs
managed independently by designated agencies as authorized by Congress. Examples
include the Federal Aviation Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Government
Accountability Office, and Transportation Security Administration. The Office of
Personnel Management plays a crucial role in implementing and overseeing alternative
PFP systems and improving their human resource management practices on the basis
of evaluations and review results. Currently, over 30 agencies have adopted PFP
systems as either demonstration projects or independent systems, covering over
360,000 federal employees (OPM, 2008). These are reviewed in table 1.
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Table 1.  Pay-for-Performance Systems in Federal Agencies
Agency Start date Total employees
Demonstration projects 43,676
Defense Department (DoD)—Navy’s China Lake facility 1980 3,843
Commerce Department—National Institute of Standards and Technology 1988 2,700
Commerce Department—various components 1998 7,440
DoD—Acquisition Workforce 1999 2,267
DoD—Science and Technology Laboratory
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Agency Start date Total employees
DoD—Air Force Research Laboratory 1997 2,631
DoD—Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center 1997 2,623
DoD—Army Research Laboratory 1998 1,868
DoD—Medical Research and Material Command 1998 1,345
DoD—Naval Sea Systems Command 1998 12,701
DoD—Engineer Research and Development Center 1998 1,528
DoD—Naval Research Laboratory 1999 2,322
DoD—Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center 2002 1,833
Energy Department—National Nuclear Security Administration 2008 2,093
Independent systems 311,687
Transportation Department—Federal Aviation Administration 1996 37,020
Treasury Department—Internal Revenue Service 2001 8,176*
Government Accountability Office 2002 2,746
Homeland Security Department—Transportation Security Administration 2006 61,475
Treasury Department—Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau 2003 127
Justice Department—Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 2001 279
Intelligence Community 2006 **
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 1998 **
DoD—National Security Personnel System 2004 187,000
Treasury Department—Office of Thrift Supervision 1989 1,015
Treasury Department—Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1991 3,129
National Credit Union Administration 1992 904
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2003 5,021
Farm Credit Administration 1993 264
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2006 500
Federal Housing Finance Board 1995 136
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 1992 259
Securities and Exchange Commission 2002 3,636
Government-wide executive pay 8,305
Senior Executive Service 2004 7,338
Senior Foreign Service 2004 967
Grand total 363,668
Source: OPM, 2008.
* Number includes only supervisory employees.
** Data were not provided by the agency. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Work Motivation
Work motivation has long been recognized as a work-related attitude along with
job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Rainey, 1997), and serves to achieve
an organization’s goals (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). In recent years, much research has
been carried out on intrinsic-extrinsic motivation in public administration (see, for
example, Bertelli, 2006; Moon, 2000; Moynihan, 2008; Oh & Lewis, 2009; Stazyk,
2009)—especially on the specific motivation of public servants, known as public service
motivation. Perry and Wise (1990) coined this term to explain the unique identity of
public servants, and their motivation as distinct from that of employees of private
organizations. A large body of research has identified that public employees have
higher degrees of public service motivation than do private workers (see Gabris &
Simo, 1995; Houston, 2000; Jurkiewica, Massey, & Brown, 1998; Wittmer, 1991).
While many types of motivation can be conceptualized, motivation is frequently
divided into two categories: intrinsic and extrinsic (Atkinson, 1964; Calder & Staw,
1975; Notz, 1975; Sansone & Harackiewicz, 2000). Although the dichotomy between
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is not clear-cut, the concepts have been widely used
in a variety of academic disciplines including psychology (Cameron & Pierce, 1994;
Frey, 1997; Notz, 1975). Intrinsic motivation derives from the expected pleasure of
work itself rather than its outcomes, and operates in pursuit of self-administered
rewards rather than tangible rewards offered by external authorities (Shamir, 1991),
while extrinsic motivation is induced by an external intervention (Frey, 1997).
Motivation will be intrinsic if a person in an organization works to fulfill its norms
without receiving commands or monetary incentives. Fischhoff (1982) asserted that
intrinsic motivation is a primary motivation among human beings. Deci (1975) stated
that “intrinsically motivated behavior is a behavior which is motivated by a person’s
need for feeling competent and self-determining in dealing with his environment” (p.
100). Deci argued that an intrinsically motivated person seeks to behave in a way that
causes him or her to feel competent and self-determining, and the person’s need for
these feelings motivates goal-directed behavior within the organization. (For instance,
he described conquering challenges as a way to make a person feel competent and
self-determining.) In addition, Deci and Ryan (1985) suggested that interest, enjoyment,
and satisfaction are key emotions in accordance with intrinsic motivation.
In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to “the performance of an activity because it
leads to external rewards (e.g., status, approval, or passing grades)” (Deci, 1972, p. 113).
Extrinsically motivated individuals anticipate compensation for their work results, and
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their work motivation largely stems from tangible rewards such as money. The typical
institutional design for extrinsically motivated people is to link work outcomes and
monetary incentives: pay-for-performance (Osterloh & Frey, 2000).
Luthans and Keitner (1975) coined the terms contrived rewards and natural
rewards to describe means of motivating workers; the former refers to extrinsic values
such as money and promotion, which may work well for extrinsically motivated people;
the latter refers to intrinsic values, including recognition, challenging assignments, and
autonomy. Whether intrinsic or extrinsic values are more appropriate for motivating
individuals to work better depends on assumptions about human nature. There are two
contrasting views of human behavior in organizations: neoclassical economics and
behavioral views (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). While the behavioral perspective assumes
that individuals are intrinsically motivated to pursue organizational goals, the neoclas-
sical economics view postulates that individuals are utility maximizers who pursues
their self-interests instead of organizational goals (Caporaso & Levine, 1992).
In the neoclassical economics view, the use of extrinsic incentives is considered a
reliable means to motivate employees to work in a goal-oriented manner, though
this view also acknowledges the existence of intrinsic motivation. Moynihan (2008)
contended that the market model emphasizes extrinsic values, while the normative
model emphasizes intrinsic values, indicating that the adoption of the market model by
public organizations would have a detrimental effect on intrinsically motivated
employees. Normatively, it may be that the use of intrinsic motivation is preferred
over extrinsic motivation for organizations to accomplish their goals (Osterloh & Frey,
2000). However, it may not be possible to use only intrinsic employee incentives, nor
is it desirable to rely heavily on monetary incentives (Frey, 1997).
Public administration scholars have had an interest in sectoral differences with
respect to intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Prior empirical research has shown that
employees in the private sector are more likely to be extrinsically motivated than those
in the public sector (Rainey, 1982; Schuster, 1974; Solomon, 1986; Wittmer, 1991).
Newstrom and his colleagues (1976) found that public employees placed less impor-
tance on direct and indirect economic benefits as an organizational reward than did
private employees. Crewson (1997) and Houston (2000) showed that public employees
perceived intrinsic rewards (such as helping other people or society) as a more impor-
tant job factor than extrinsic values (such as high income), to a greater extent than
private employees.
Work Motivation and Pay Systems in the Public Sector
As the PFP scheme is commonly used in the public sector, many public administra-
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tion scholars have raised the motivational issue on the basis of social psychological
theories, proposing that extrinsic rewards may undermine intrinsic and public service
motivations of public employees—that is, the crowding-out effect is a major concern
(Bertelli, 2006; Houston, 2009; Moynihan, 2008). Moynihan (2008) averred that
market-based mechanisms including PFP pose a threat to public service motivation,
and that they attract only extrinsic-reward-centered workers to the public sector, which
may “convert the public servant into a market actor” (p. 250).
Drawing on crowding-out theory (e.g., Calder & Staw, 1975; Deci, 1971, 1972,
1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; Notz, 1975), some public
administration scholars empirically investigated how PFP affects the motivation of
employees in public agencies. Analyzing perceptions of employees working in the
Internal Revenue Service, Bertelli (2006) found that the crowding-out phenomenon
exists among supervisory-level employees under the PFP-based pay banding system
using high-powered incentives; in contrast, crowding-in takes place among non-
supervisors under the general schedule pay system.
Stazyk (2009) investigated the relationship between performance-based variable
pay systems—pay-for-performance, competency-based pay, team-based pay, and
gainsharing—and public service motivation in local government. He revealed that the
variable pay systems could crowd out intrinsic motivation with higher levels of public
service motivation and concluded that the relationship between the PFP system and
intrinsic motivation is highly contextual. Bertelli (2006) argued that a well-designed
PFP scheme should crowd in intrinsic motivation. Deckop and Cirka (2000) claimed
that the relationship between PFP and intrinsic motivation is contingent on the fairness
of performance appraisal systems. They found that employees in nonprofit organiza-
tions who perceived that their performance appraisal system was significantly unfair
encountered a reduction in intrinsic motivation after the implementation of a PFP
system.
By contrast, social psychologists highlight psychological contexts to explain the
crowding effects of external rewards, maintaining that the extrinsic rewards can result
in either the crowding-in or crowding-out effect depending on individuals’ perceptions
of the rewards. Deci (1971) made the claim that external rewards should crowd out
intrinsic motivation when individuals perceive them as a control mechanism, while the
rewards should crowd in intrinsic motivation if individuals perceive them as a role of
information (see also Deci, 1972, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985). Similarly, Frey (1997)
predicted a crowding-out effect when individuals perceive external incentives as
controlling, but a crowding-in effect when they perceive them as supporting their own
values. Andersen and Pallesen (2008) confirmed Frey’s predictions, finding that
researchers in the Danish public education sector crowd out intrinsic motivation when
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they perceive financial incentives as controlling, whereas they crowd in intrinsic
motivation when they perceive financial incentives as supportive.
Deci and Ryan (1985) claimed that contingent rewards led to a reduction in intrinsic
motivation. They argued that “competitively contingent rewards are the most control-
ling, performance-contingent less so, and task-contingent even less than performance-
contingent” (p. 81). In their terms, it seems reasonable to think that PFP is perceived
as a controlling mechanism in organizations. Moynihan (2008) expressed concern that
market control systems could make it difficult for public employees to exercise moral
judgment or act in accordance with public demands and preferences. In addition, a
PFP scheme using high-powered financial incentives can change institutional values
from public values such as public ethics to self-utility maximization in the public sector,
so that public employees become extrinsically motivated. Thompson (2006) stated that
the introduction of PFP in the public sector was a deinstitutionalization process by
which public ethics values were transferred to instrumental values. Taken together, it is
hypothesized that public employees in a PFP system are more likely than those in a
GS system to pursue extrinsic values but less likely to pursue intrinsic values.
Hypothesis 1: Employees working in a PFP system show a higher level of
extrinsic motivation than those working in a GS system.
Hypothesis 2: Employees working in a PFP system show a lower level of
intrinsic motivation than those working in a GS system.
METHODS
Data
The data analyzed here are from the Merit Principles Survey collected by the Merit
System Protection Board in 2005. The Board regularly investigates how successful
federal agencies are at accomplishing their organizational goals and dealing with the
difficulties of public employees. The target population of the survey consists of 1.8
million full-time employees working in federal agencies. A probability-based multi-
stage random sample design was employed for the sample to be representative of the
population. A total of 36,926 employees participated in interviews via e-mail, achieving
a response rate of about 50 percent. The dataset has agency-level identifiers, so that
two different groups have been identified: PFP and GS agencies. In total, 45 agencies
were included in the sample: 13 with a PFP system and 32 with a GS system. From
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the PFP group, only seven agencies were included in the analysis: the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; National Institute of Standards and Technology; National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Transportation Security Administration;
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Federal Aviation Administration;
and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.1 The GS group included the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Social Security Administration, and others.
Variables
In order to measure the work values of employees, 12 survey questions were
utilized along with the question, “How important are each of the following in motivating
you to do a good job?” (table 2). Exploratory factor analysis was used to examine the
underlying factor structures and their internal reliability of measurement. As the table
shows, varimax rotation generated two factors for the 12 items. The eigenvalues of the
two factors are 2.59 and 2.30, indicating that approximately 46.1 percent of variation
in the items is accounted for by factor 1 and an additional 44.2 percent is accounted for
by factor 2. In order to check the internal consistency of each factor, the Cronbach’s
alpha coefficient of reliability for each was examined. Both factors had a high value of
alpha: 0.78 for factor 1 and 0.79 for factor 2. The six items in factor 1 include “desire
not to let my supervisor down,” “my duty as a public employee,” and “personal pride
or satisfaction in my work.” The factor loadings of the items in factor 1 range from
0.46 to 0.73. Since all of these items are related to intrinsic work values, this study
uses the term intrinsic values for this value. Factor 2 includes six items, including “a
cash award of $1,000,” “desire for a good performance rating,” and “increased
chances for promotion,” and is termed extrinsic values. The response category for
each variable was a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree), and all scores were recoded as 1 for “strongly agree” and “agree,” 0
for “strongly disagree” and “disagree.” The scores of the neutral category and “DK”
option were excluded from the analysis.
The main independent variable of interest was the pay system in which an individual
was working—a dummy variable coded as 1 for the PFP system and 0 for the GS
system. To accurately capture the relationship between pay systems and employee
motivation, some variables should be controlled for. It may be that people with a high
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1. The Internal Revenue Service was excluded because it has both GS and PFP systems (for
nonsupervisory and supervisory employees, respectively). Five additional agencies were
excluded because their PFP policies were implemented after 2005, when the survey was
conducted.
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Table 2.  Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values with Exploratory Factor Analysis
Item Factor 1 Factor 2
(1) Desire not to let my supervisor down 0.613 0.195
(2) Desire not to let my coworkers down 0.731 0.061
(3) Recognition from my coworkers 0.460 0.265
(4) My duty as a public employee 0.563 0.081
(5) Desire to help my work unit meet its goals 0.722 0.143
(6) Personal pride or satisfaction in my work 0.542 -0.009
(7) Cash award of $100 0.019 0.717
(8) Cash award of $1,000 0.031 0.699
(9) Desire for a good performance rating 0.435 0.473
(10) Increased chances for promotion 0.285 0.484
(11) Time-off award of eight hours 0.029 0.660
(12) Non-cash recognition (for example, letter of appreciation) 0.256 0.515
Eigenvalue for all items 2.59 2.30
Variance explained by each factor (%) 46.1 44.2
Reliability coefficient of alpha 0.78 0.79
Note: The varimax method was utilized for rotation.
Table 3.  Correlation Matrix of Value Variables




(4) 0.29 0.36 0.24
(5) 0.46 0.53 0.33 0.48
(6) 0.27 0.37 0.21 0.40 0.44
(7) 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.00*
(8) 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.59
(9) 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.21 0.32 0.16 0.29 0.34
(10) 0.37 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.40 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.49
(11) 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.51 0.47 0.32 0.30
(12) 0.24 0.19 0.32 0.21 0.26 0.13 0.40 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.41
* not significant at the 0.10 level
level of income are more likely to value extrinsic rewards than their counterparts.
Therefore, the income variable needs to be controlled for. Other sociodemographic
control variables that might affect perceptions and attitudes, such as age, race, gender,
and years of education, were introduced into the statistical model.
Statistical Model
The dependent variable is a binary response. There are three approaches to devel-
oping a model for the dichotomy outcome variable: the linear probability, logit, and
probit models (Gujarity, 2003). The linear probability model is a typical linear model
using OLS estimation with binary outcome, following the Bernoulli probability distri-
bution. Although it is easy to use, it has some weaknesses. As the error disturbances
are not assumed to be normally distributed because they follow the Bernoulli distribu-
tion, the variance of errors is not constant, resulting in heteroscedasticity; the estimator
is inefficient and the standard error is over- or under-estimated. In addition, this model
may produce a predicted value that is negative or greater than 1, though the range of
the value is from 0 to 1(Gujarity, 2003; Long, 1997).
The logit and probit models are alternative approaches to resolving the problems of
the linear probability model. Both resort to the maximum likelihood estimation
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Table 4.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Main Variables in the Two Pay Systems
Factor Variable
PFP GS
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Not letting down supervisor 4.15 (0.88) 4.19 (0.86)
Not letting down coworker 4.42 (0.70) 4.40 (0.71)
Intrinsic
Recognition 3.95 (0.85) 3.91 (0.90)
Personal pride 4.74 (0.48) 4.75 (0.49)
Duty as a public servant 4.27 (0.75) 4.40 (0.70)
Helping agency meet its goal 4.33 (0.68) 4.41 (0.67)
Reward of $100 2.89 (1.10) 2.91 (1.12)
Reward of $1,000 3.83 (1.02) 3.83 (1.03)
Extrinsic
Promotion 3.70 (1.09) 3.87 (1.04)
Good performance rating 4.05 (0.87) 4.12 (0.86)
Time off reward 3.23 (1.14) 3.30 (1.16)
Non-cash recognition 3.18 (1.10) 3.25 (1.16)
Note: All values were uncontrolled average scores on the basis of a five-point scale.
method, which provides consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normal estimates
(Long, 1997). The logit model uses the logit link function to transform the mean of
linear probability to the value in a natural log of odds, which makes the probability of
the predicted value lie within the range of 0 to 1. The errors are assumed to have logistic
distribution in the model: mean=0, variance=π2/3 (≈3.29). The logit model resorts to a
cumulative logistic function2 to predict the probability of the outcome variable. In
contrast, the errors are assumed to have normal distribution with mean of 0 and vari-
ance of 1 in the probit model, which uses the cumulative normal distribution function.3
Although the two models use different distribution functions, estimates derived from
both models are similar. The logit model, however, is preferred because of comparative
simplicity in interpretation (Gujarity, 2003). For this reason, this study utilizes the logit
model (or logistic regression) to test the hypotheses.
RESULTS
Table 5 presents the logit models predicting differences in perceived intrinsic work
values between the pay systems after controlling for demographic and job-related
variables. There is no significant difference in perceptions between the GS and the PFP
agencies with respect to the “letting down supervisor” variable; however, a significant
difference (p < 0.05) exists between the two groups for the “letting down coworker”
measure: employees in the PFP are less likely to let down a coworker than those in the
GS. Public managers in the PFP system have a tendency to be recognized in the
agency, compared with those in the GS system (odds ratio: e(0.32) = 1.38). In other
words, an employee’s odds of being recognized in a PFP system are 38 percent greater
than those in a GS system.
For public service duty, there is a significant difference in perceptions between
PFP and GS employees (p < 0.001) after controlling for all other variables. It can be
interpreted that GS employees are about twice as likely as PFP employees to report
that public service duty is important to them as a work motivator.4 Given that the
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3. P(Z) = ∫ ––––––– e–(X–µ)2 / 2σ2–∞ √–––––2σ2π
4. The odds ratio for PFP employees is e(-0.70)=0.497. In order to interpret the odds ratio
more easily, I recalculated the odds ratio for GS employees as 1/0.497=2.01 (odds ratio
for GS employees).
magnitudes of the regression coefficient and odds ratio are larger than any other
variables in the intrinsic value models, this value may be a striking feature of the GS
system. However, there is no significant difference in employees’ helping behaviors
within their agencies.
Job position is positively associated with a set of intrinsic values. This indicates
that the higher the position of the employees, the more likely it is that they will perceive
intrinsic work values as important. The income variable also posits a systematic pattern
across the models, indicating that the higher the income, the less likely it is that
employees perceive intrinsic values as important after controlling for all other variables.
Given that the proportions of employees in a high job position and distributions of
income differ across the agencies, position and income are important control variables
to take into account the reporting bias in these models.
For extrinsic values (see table 6), there is no significant difference between the two
groups in perceptions of a $100 reward. However, perceptions of a $1,000 reward
differ between the two groups (p < 0.01), indicating that PFP employees are more
likely than those in a GS system to report that a reward of $1,000 is an important work
motivator. The odds of stating that a reward of $1,000 is an important motivation are
23 percent greater (odds ratio: e(0.21)=1.23) among employees in the PFP systems than
among those in the GS systems after controlling for all other variables. It is speculated
that $100 may be considered by both groups to be too small an amount to be a work
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Table 5.  Logit Models Predicting Perceptual Differences in Intrinsic Values between 
PFP and GS Systems
Variable Not letting Not letting Recognition Personal pride Duty as a Helping agency down supervisor down coworker public servant meet its goal
Pay systems 
(PFP =1) 0.00 (0.11) 0.50 (0.21)** 0.32 (0.11)*** 0.64 (0.59) -0.70 (0.16)*** 0.23 (0.24)
Male -0.30 (0.07)*** -0.20 (0.11)* 0.09 (0.06) -0.40 (0.27) 0.11 (0.12) -0.66 (0.15)
Minor -0.00 (0.08) -0.37 (0.11)*** -0.06 (0.07) -0.79 (0.26)*** 0.33 (0.15)** 0.30 (0.17)*
Age -0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01)
Income -0.28 (0.09)*** -0.48 (0.14)*** -0.28 (0.08)*** 0.09 (0.33) -0.60 (0.16)*** -0.69 (0.18)***
Years of tenure -0.01 (0.00)** -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) -0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Position 0.28 (0.03)*** 0.52 (0.05)*** 0.22 (0.03)*** 0.32 (0.13)** 0.20 (0.05)*** 0.64 (0.07)***
Likelihood ratio 96.19*** 132.48*** 120.84*** 21.95*** 72.30*** 117.10***
χ2
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
N = 31,101
motivator, but that a reward of $1,000 is differently perceived by the two groups. This
motivational gap between the two groups would likely remain wide as the magnitude
of a cash reward increases.
For promotion, the difference in the log odds between the two groups is 0.20,
which is statistically significant at the level of 0.05, suggesting that public managers in
the PFP systems are about 1.2 times (odds ratio: 1.22) more likely than their counterparts
in the GS systems to think that promotion is an important motivator. The magnitude of
the coefficient of the main independent variable in the good performance rating model
is the largest among the models for extrinsic values. The odds of reporting that a good
performance rating is an important motivator for PFP employees are about 1.6 times
(odds ratio: e(0.48)=1.62) greater than for GS employees. This indicates that employees
in the PFP agencies place higher importance on good performance ratings than those
in the GS agencies. There is no significant difference in perception of the time-off
reward between the groups; however, non-cash recognition such as a letter of appreci-
ation may be a more important value in GS agencies than in PFP agencies (odds ratio:
e(-0.14)=0.87; p < 0.05).
Gender is a significant factor that affects perceptions of extrinsic values. In fact, the
systematic differences between men and women do not appear in the models of intrinsic
values—only the first two models are significant. Female workers are more likely than
males to perceive sets of extrinsic values as an important motivator, after controlling
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Table 6.  Logit Models Predicting Perceptual Differences in Extrinsic Values between 
PFP and GS Systems
Good Time-off Non-cash 
Variable $100 reward $1,000 reward Promotion performance reward recognition
rating
Pay systems 
(PFP =1) 0.10 (0.07) 0.21 (0.08)*** 0.20 (0.08)** 0.48 (0.13)*** -0.10 (0.07) -0.14 (0.06)**
Male -0.16 (0.04)*** -0.13 (0.05)** -0.18 (0.05)*** -0.64 (0.08)*** -0.00 (0.00)* -0.35 (0.04)***
Minor 0.17 (0.04)*** -0.03 (0.06) 0.67 (0.06)*** 0.60 (0.10)*** 0.33 (0.05)*** 0.57 (0.05)***
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.03 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)***
Income -1.73 (0.06)*** -0.01 (0.07)*** -1.43 (0.08)*** -0.78 (0.10)*** -1.14 (0.06)*** -0.63 (0.05)***
Years of tenure 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00)
Position -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.10 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.02)*** 0.00 (0.03) -0.25 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.02)**
Likelihood ratio 1,997.50*** 452.99*** 1,116.63*** 257.88*** 1,908.67*** 637.87***
χ2
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
N = 31,078
for pay systems and other demographic variables.
In short, the direction of regression coefficients is not fully consistent with the
expectations that intrinsic values such as recognition and helping coworkers are a
feature of individuals in PFP agencies. However, public service duty is found to be
an important characteristic of public managers in GS agencies. Systematic differences
in extrinsic values exist between public managers in the PFP and the GS systems—
especially cash rewards, promotions, and performance ratings. Public managers in
the PFP systems have a higher propensity to hold these values than those in the GS
systems, after controlling for other sociodemographic variables.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This empirical study suggests that public employees in PFP systems are more likely
to place importance on money, promotion, and performance, whereas those in GS
systems place a value on duty as a public servant. Prior studies of sectoral difference
have emphasized a public-versus-private distinction with respect to motivation and
attitudes, but the current study empirically uncovers differences within the public
sector depending on compensation policy. The idea that PFP mechanisms work well
for public employees is grounded in the assumption that public- and private-sector
managers are alike. However, it is well recognized that public servants characterized
by public service motivation place less importance on extrinsic values such as money
and promotion than do those in the private sector (Khojasteh, 1993; Rainey, 1982;
Wittmer, 1991). Georgellis, Iossa, and Tabvuma (2011) found that individuals in the
United Kingdom who place a high value on intrinsic values have a tendency to work
for the public sector and that higher extrinsic rewards reduce the willingness of
intrinsically motivated persons to choose public-sector employment. The difference in
employee motivation between two pay systems within the public sector was masked
by the public-private distinction, but this study has clearly revealed differences within
the public sector, demonstrating that individuals are more motivated by extrinsic
values such as money, good performance rating, and promotion in market-based PFP
systems than in GS systems.
These findings uphold the crowding-out perspective. Crowding-out theory posits
that high-powered monetary incentives have negative consequences on individuals’
intrinsic motivation, undermining it while reinforcing extrinsic motivation. Crowd-
ing-out is mainly demonstrated by experiments in the psychology field, but public
administration scholars have recently tested the theory in the context of public organi-
zations (for example, Bertelli, 2006; Georgellis et al., 2011). The main message of the
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studies is that high-powered monetary incentives undermine intrinsic motivation,
making public employees pursue extrinsic values in public organizations. While not
revealing whether or not the public service (or intrinsic) motivation of public employees
has changed due to the PFP mechanism, this study suggests that the job attitudes of
public employees in the two pay systems are systematically different. Accordingly,
crowding-out may be one possible explanation why employees in PFP agencies
behave more like “market actors” than do those in agencies with GS systems. Thompson
(2006) contended that market considerations in the public sector may weaken the
value-oriented behavior of actors: “pay-banding and pay-for-performance systems that
make performance more consequential inevitably exacerbate the tensions between
enhancing performance and acting pursuant to a public service ethic” (p. 498).
The findings can also be accounted for by a selection-in perspective that individuals
are attracted to organizations on the basis of attributes such as personality, values, and
the goals, processes, and structures of the organization. In other words, extrinsically
motivated job seekers who place a high value on money are selected into agencies
with PFP systems because of high-powered incentive structures, which may result in
different job attitudes than those in GS agencies. At present, the maximum pay
increase rate of PFP systems is about 10-12 percent within the same pay band. It might
seem that extrinsically motivated people choose federal agencies with PFP for
employment, as the maximum pay increase rate increases within the paybanding level.
Market actors have a tendency to pursue self-interest, rather than public interest, only
responding to high-powered incentives. Frey and Osterloh (2005) also asserted that
high-powered incentive structures have a negative effect on employees by shifting
their interest from the work itself to money.
Based on these findings, this study makes the claim that personnel policy makers
must be cautious about using a high-powered incentive as a motivator in public agencies.
They need to keep in mind that high-powered monetary incentives can bring about
negative consequences, as discussed previously, and thus institutional arrangements
need to be designed to avoid such side effects. For instance, Moynihan’s suggestions
are noteworthy that a PFP system needs to have a link between performance measures
and intrinsic values, cultivate public service motivation of employees through a variety
of programs, and reduce high-powered incentives as a motivator (Moynihan, 2008).
Formal training and mentoring programs are also good strategies to instill public
ethics and values in public employees in agencies with PFP.
There is a methodological limitation to be addressed in this study. The empirical
findings were derived from secondary survey data. Empirical tests for the crowding-out
and selection-in phenomena need to be conducted with an appropriate research design
for which the motivational changes of employees can be observed with time, or attitu-
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dinal gaps between job candidates can be identified at the pre-entry level. Future
research needs to use appropriate designs to identify these relationships. Despite the
limitations, these findings make a contribution to the public administration literature
by revealing that PFP as a private-sector managerial practice influences employee
motivation and job candidates’ preferences for employment.
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